The original Chinese article appeared in Malaysiakini
WHEN I was studying in Australia, I had a close Malay friend. He was active in the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM) and also a part of “Reformasi” movement.
He was also active in Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) but when the influence of ABIM in PKR became insignificant, he left PKR.
After completing his doctoral degree, he joined the International University Malaysia as a lecturer. After a couple of years, I got word from a friend that he became an assistant to a minister.
His change in political orientation is not an isolated case and also reflects very much psyche of some urban middle class Malay-Muslims.
I remember him as a good-mannered devoted Muslim. When we all went for a grub, he was careful to make sure his food was Halal.
But he was not racist nor extreme in his views.
While he was aware of the transparency and ethical issues of some Umno leaders, he was also mindful of PKR having given up on the fight for Islam as well as the increasing influence of DAP in Pakatan Rakyat (PR). He felt PR might no longer be a platform to defend the interests of the Muslims.
In my observation, he was dissatisfied with the corruption issues in Umno but he also feared the weakening of Islamic politics if the government was changed.
Multiple faces to Malay anxieties
What my friend went through tells me three things.
Number one: The Malay anxiety is real to a certain extent. It cannot be taken only as a made-up issue by Umno leaders or the media.
Number two: The Malay anxiety is not only felt across urban and rural areas but also across all classes.
Number three: The Malay anxiety is not only caused by ethnic or religious matters but also economical and political factors.
Not all Malays in the rural areas are poor. A number of people living in Felda may even have a more comfortable life than those living in the cities.
The Low Yat plaza incident reflected on how lost some young urban Malays are. The racial disputes at Taman Medan years ago and the recent cross removal protests are all indications of the dilemma felt by some Malays in the lower income groups while the rise of the Malaysian Muslim Solidarity (ISMA) in Bangi reflects the worries of some upper-middle class Malays.
Poll data show no more than one-third of Malays supported the Bersih 4.0 rally while less than a quarter of Malays agreed on the 916 red shirt Malaysia Day rally which was said to defend the dignity of Malays.
Whether yellow or red, urban Malays seem indifferent. This may reflect the view of many Malays — they worry about the weakening of the Malay political status after the fall of Umno but they are also dissatisfied with the performances of some Umno leaders.
Malays’ role in social movements
The lack of interest of Malay in participating in Bersih rallies is not surprising. Two years ago, around eighty to ninety per cent of the participants for the Lynas protest were Chinese. If we are talking about protests regarding Chinese interest issues, then it is reasonable for the majority of participants being Chinese.
However, a major environmental issue where no skin colour was involved, did not manage to attract the active participation of the nation’s largest ethnic group. So what is the reason?
This may be due to the gap in information dissemination.This gap may not lie between the urban and rural areas but in language.
The rare earth plant issue was widely reported in Chinese and English media while many promotional activities were also posted on Facebook in English and Chinese.
However, if you were to say the government was more stringent in controlling Malay media, then why didn’t Malay Facebook users break through the media blockade in a different way to shine light on the Lynas issue?
This may be related to the current Malay political and social values. What political orientation does most urban Malays have? What kind of political discourse and social issues can attract their attention?
Earlier this year, when the march to demand the release of Anwar proceeded, I found myself looking at an interesting phenomenon. The rally consisted of a mix of Chinese and Malays where most were young people.
During the procession, I did not hear any Muslim protesters shouting religious sensitive slogans which indicated most of the young Muslims who participated in the protest that day were not Islamists.
The main reason was, of course, due to PAS which did not actively mobilise its members but what we should be more concerned about are: Where have all those middle class Malays who strongly supported Anwar in 1998 gone? Have they changed their political orientation just like my friend whom I mentioned earlier?
Why are the emerging middle-class devoted Muslims not backing Anwar up? What issues are they really concerned about?
Highlighting moral issues to divert attention
Compared to social justice related issues, many Malay Facebook users are more keen to discuss issues concerning the Islamic symbol or personal morality.
Many Malay women would often share on Facebook their ever changing colourful Islamic fashion while some men struggle to expose those Muslim celebrities who do not wear headscarves.
This also explains why some of the Malay media actually cover more of Berih rally’s so-called “immoral” behaviour such as holding the symbol of gay rights — the rainbow flag — young women taking close photos with Mat Sabu or stepping on pictures of political leaders to divert focus on the initial purpose of the rally.
Of course, this does not reflect the views of all Muslims but it is likely a reflection of the mentality of many middle class urban Muslims — enthusiastic in spending but still holding conservative moral values, no obvious political identity but tending to support those parties which promote Islam.
Over the years, the Malay political power has become increasingly divided. In addition to Umno, PAS and PKR, DAP has also started to receive support from some Malays.
With the recent internal disputes in Umno, the splitting of PAS and the rise of Amanah, perception of the fragmentation of the Malay politics has only strengthened.
In fact, Malays are not monolithic. It is understandable that different Malays hold different political values and support different political parties.
However, what served as a foil for the division of Malay politics was not the division of Chinese politics but the convergence of the Chinese votes where most Chinese support the opposition.
Although Umno leaders and the media are keen on discussing DAP’s overwhelming power, in fact, many Chinese voters who support the government reformation, are not necessarily DAP supporters as they also vote for PKR and even PAS.
Trenchant DAP causes unease
During the last election, the slogan “UBAH” proposed by DAP overshadowed the previous “REFORMASI” slogan.
Lim Kit Siang putting on a display of conquering the BN fortress — Johor — had far overshadowed Anwar’s show. After the election, DAP, compared to the other two parties, owned the largest number of parliamentary seats in PR.
These things are part of the Malay exacerbated anxiety. They worry that after reformation, DAP, where majority members are Chinese, will grow in power and the interests of the Malays will be marginalised.
In recent years, DAP has taken a series of measures to win over the trust of the Malays but some high-profile moves might just end up backfiring.
DAP pulled in Malay elites to join the party but some media described the move as just using those Malays to become “vases.”
The positive relief and building of a mosque in Kelatan was interpreted as the wealthy Chinese helping the poor Malays while supporting Malays are believed to split Muslims.
Although these perceptions do not necessarily reflect reality, it has deepened the anxiety felt by Malays. Perhaps, DAP leaders should learn to be more low profile but that does not mean becoming political dwarfs. They should show the responsibility and humbleness of a mature political party should have in our plural society.
Some DAP leaders believe that the party can consolidate the support of Malays by pulling them to join the party and also strengthening Amanah.
Amanah’s proposed inclusive Islam can certainly attract the support of many pious and progressive Muslims but may not necessarily win over those traditional PAS supporters.
From Kelantan to Selangor, conservative islamists are found across urban and rural constituencies. They are estimated to occupy one-fifth of the Muslim voters — they are the loyal supporters of PAS.
PAS still has many supporters from all levels
Losing the support of these conservative voters, many parliament members from PKR most likely would not retain their Malay-majority seats.
This is why in the campaigns in Muslim minority constituencies, DAP can “shout” loudly and compete against PAS while PKR is still taking account of the possible cooperation with PAS.
Some DAP leaders accused PKR of short-sightedness but have they ever thought that if PKR and Amanah jointly contest against PAS in a three-cornered fight, thus decreasing the number of Malay seats contested with a palpable effect on the situation of “Malays in the government while Chinese in the opposition becomes imminent, this will definitely not be a good sign for the democratic process.
The Malay anxiety is the Malaysian anxiety. The Malay anxiety is complex and can be said to be “constructed” but it is real.
It should not be reduced to being just a “difference” between liberal and conservative, urban and rural, middle class and poor.
Aside from political passions, we should actually try to understand and also reduce the Malay anxiety.